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Symposium: The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker's Disruption Tests
Abstract

This past spring marked the fortieth anniversary of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, the landmark student speech case in which the Supreme Court held that three students were
protected by the First Amendment when they wore black armbands in their Des Moines, Iowa public schools
to protest the Vietnam War. Looking at Supreme Court precedent alone, it would seem as though the Tinker
tests were created out of whole cloth: the substantial or material disruption, reasonable anticipation of such
disruption, and rights of others tests did not have much of a basis in earlier Supreme Court decisions. But, the
district court in Tinker had employed the first two of these tests. For authority, it had looked to the Fifth
Circuit’s decisions six weeks prior in two cases involving high school students’ speech about civil rights:
Burnside v. Byars and Blackwell v. Issaquena County. Aside from Tinker’s citations to Burnside and Blackwell,
those two cases - the roots of Tinker’s disruption tests - have largely been lost to history. Accordingly, this
Article scrutinizes Burnside and Blackwell, considers lower courts’ applications of - and retreat from - the
Burnside/Blackwell actual disruption test in the student speech context, and analyzes the presence of
Burnside and Blackwell in the Tinker district court opinion and in various drafts of the Tinker Supreme Court
opinion. Struggles for students’ speech rights and battles waged by the Civil Rights Movement rarely are seen
as intertwined strands of history, but this Article demonstrates that the student free speech rights articulated
in Tinker are built upon the struggles of the Civil Rights Movement.
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INTRODUCTION
This spring marks the fortieth anniversary of Tinker v. Des Moines
1
Independent Community School District, the landmark student speech
case decided in 1969 in which the Supreme Court held that three
students were protected by the First Amendment when they wore
black armbands in their Des Moines, Iowa public schools to protest
2
the Vietnam War. Tinker was quite a departure from what came
before it; prior to Tinker, it was not a foregone conclusion that
3
students had any affirmative free speech rights in public schools.
Looking at Supreme Court precedent alone, it would seem as though
the Tinker tests were created out of whole cloth: the substantial or
material disruption, reasonable anticipation of such disruption, and
rights of others tests did not have much of a basis in earlier Supreme
4
Court decisions. But, the district court in Tinker had employed the
5
first two of these tests. For authority, it had looked to the Fifth
Circuit’s decisions six weeks prior in two cases involving high school
6
students’ speech about civil rights: Burnside v. Byars and Blackwell v.
7
Issaquena County.
Burnside and Blackwell arose out of separate Mississippi
communities, yet the speech in the two cases was largely the same: at
the height of the Civil Rights Movement, groups of high school
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. Id. at 523–24.
3. See, e.g., Richard L. Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of
Schooling in America, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 567, 568–69, 580 (1970) (“A notable
departure from this tradition of judicial timidity is [Tinker] . . . . Implicit in this
decision was a view of the purposes and methods of education different from that
traditionally expressed by American courts. . . . [In Tinker,] there is n one of the
familiar rhetoric about the disciplinary purposes of education.”).
4. Id. at 509, 513.
5. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D.
Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
7. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
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students in the Deep South wore buttons to school protesting the
denial of voting rights to African-Americans. In one case, wearing
buttons was the full extent of the conduct; in the other case, the
students wore buttons and also distributed them in a reportedly
aggressive manner that interrupted the school day. These two cases
were consolidated at the appellate level and decided by the same
8
panel of the Fifth Circuit in 1966.
Without citation to any
supporting authority, the Fifth Circuit applied an actual disruption
test in both Burnside and Blackwell, finding disruption in one case but
not in the other and protecting the non-disruptive student speech
9
under the First Amendment. Although the Fifth Circuit did not
make explicit reference to the civil rights protest cases, Burnside and
Blackwell grew out of a regional social context in which both violent
and non-violent civil rights protests occurred with regularity, and a
legal context in which the constitutionality of arresting and
convicting nonviolent protesters for offenses such as breach of the
10
peace increasingly was challenged.
Aside from Tinker’s citations to Burnside and Blackwell, those two
cases—the roots of Tinker’s disruption tests—have largely been lost to
11
history. Accordingly, Part I of this Article scrutinizes Burnside and
Blackwell, sketching the social context and civil rights struggles out of
which these cases emerged, tracing the events that preceded
litigation, and examining the district courts’ opinions and the Fifth
Circuit’s creation and use of the actual disruption test in the public
12
school context. Part II considers lower courts’ applications of—and
8. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 749; Burnside, 363 F.2d at 744; see Consolidated Brief for
Appellees at 1, Burnside, 363 F.2d 744, Blackwell, 363 F.2d 749 (Nos. 22,681, 22,712)
(noting that the Fifth Circuit granted Appellants’ Motion To Consolidate on Appeal
on August 9, 1965).
9. See Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748 (finding students’ non-disruptive behavior did
not warrant the exclusion of “freedom buttons” from the school); Blackwell, 363 F.2d
at 753 (finding students’ behavior disruptive and protecting the school’s interest in
prohibiting such behavior).
10. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 541–55 (5th
ed. 2004) (1970) (discussing racial protest and the courts’ reaction to such protests
during the Civil Rights Movement); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (2006) (noting that “[r]ules operate
in cultural contexts, and a careful observer should never lose sight of this fact” in a
discussion of the risks and potential rewards of comparative legal scholarship). See
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, at xii–xiii (2002), for a
discussion of the link between legal rights and social practices.
11. My research in the legal literature reveals a lack of in-depth examination of
either Burnside or Blackwell. Both are, of course, cited regularly as part of citations to
Tinker. A notable exception is ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED
COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009).
12. Understanding more about the context of cases and the actors involved can
“provide a rich background against which to understand the cases,” “reflect the
primal force of politics” and “generate a better understanding of the cases
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retreat from—this actual disruption test in the student speech
context, and analyzes the presence of Burnside and Blackwell in the
Tinker district court opinion and in various drafts of the Tinker
Supreme Court opinion. Struggles for students’ speech rights and
battles waged by the Civil Rights Movement rarely are seen as
intertwined strands of history, but this Article demonstrates that the
student free speech rights articulated in Tinker are built upon the
struggles of the Civil Rights Movement.
I.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S ACTUAL DISRUPTION TEST

The facts giving rise to Burnside and Blackwell occurred in a political
and social context that may today seem alien to most Americans,
especially those under the age of fifty. For many reasons, students’
advocacy of voting rights in 1964 and 1965 in Mississippi had the
13
potential to be highly volatile. Brown v. Board of Education had been
14
decided only a decade earlier. Southern support for segregation
themselves.” CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 1 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds.,
Foundation Press 2008). The “relationship between legal pronouncements and
social and political realities . . . is rarely direct. Indeed, many of the great civil rights
‘victories’ may contain less than meets the eye.” Id.; see also Patricia Ewick & Susan S.
Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 197, 199 (1995) (discussing the virtues of narratives); Reginald Oh, ReMapping Equal Protection Jurisprudence: A Legal Geography of Race and Affirmative Action,
53 AM. U. L. REV. 1305, 1311–13, 1316, 1359 (2004) (examining the significance of
legal narratives and how they impact constructions of social reality).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. In 1954, the Supreme Court declared de jure school segregation
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). One year
later, when Brown was again before the Court, it held that school segregation by law
should be brought to an end “with all deliberate speed.” See Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (considering the manner in which relief must be accorded
to the parties under its previous ruling). Government officials’ and community
leaders’ reactions to Brown I and Brown II were intense, especially across the South.
Nineteen U.S. Senators signed the Southern Manifesto, a statement that described
Brown as an “unwarranted exercise of power by the Court” and “commend[ed] the
motives of those States which have declared the intention to resist forced integration
by any lawful means.” 102 CONG. REC. 4255, 4460 (1956). Similarly, during a brief
special session requested by Governor George Wallace, the Alabama legislature
unanimously approved a resolution calling for a federal constitutional convention
with the purpose of limiting the authority of the federal government over public
elementary and secondary schools. Solons Back Wallace on School Plan, CLARIONLEDGER, Sept. 22, 1964, at 1A. An editorial from the Jackson, Mississippi Daily News
warned:
Human blood may stain Southern soil in many places because of this
decision but the dark red stains of that blood will be on the marble steps of
the United States Supreme Court building. White and Negro children in the
same schools will lead to miscegenation. Miscegenation leads to mixed
marriages and mixed marriages lead to mongrelization of the human race.
Immediate Reaction to the Decision, Brown v. Board of Education, Landmark
Supreme Court Cases, http://www.landmarkcases.org/brown/reaction.html (last
visited March 31, 2009) (quoting Editorial, Bloodstains on White Marble Steps, DAILY
NEWS (Jackson, Miss.), May 18, 1954). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE

2009] THE CIVIL RIGHTS ROOTS OF TINKER’S DISRUPTION TESTS

1133

remained so strong that the first public elementary and secondary
schools in Mississippi were not integrated until 1964, and even then
all integration statewide involved a total of only sixty AfricanAmerican students attending White schools in four different
15
districts.
Federal troops were required to protect nine AfricanAmerican students as they integrated the nearby Little Rock,
16
Arkansas Central High School in 1957, and federal marshals were
needed to quell hundreds of rioters on the University of Mississippi
(“Ole Miss”) campus in fall 1962 when James Meredith became the
first African-American student to enroll at the state’s flagship public
17
university. In June 1963, Mississippi NAACP leader Medgar Evers
18
Two
was murdered outside his home in Jackson, Mississippi.
months later Martin Luther King, Jr., gave his “I Have a Dream”
19
speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. Crosses still were
20
burned on occasion in Mississippi. And all across the Deep South,
restaurant sit-ins, boycotts of businesses and public services such as
transportation systems, and other protests disputing the systems and
21
practices of racial discrimination disrupted business as usual. In C.
Vann Woodward’s words, African-Americans “were in charge of their
22
own movement now, and youth was in the vanguard.”

JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (rev. ed. 2004) (1975), for a comprehensive history of Brown.
15. Desegregation Has Increased in Dixie, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 4, 1964, at 12A.
Tom Brady, a Mississippi trial court judge, wrote Black Monday, described by John
Hope Franklin as “a bitter tirade against [Brown] . . . arguing that blacks were not
capable of becoming equal citizens.” JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR.,
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 492 (7th ed. 1994)
(1953). The slow rate of desegregation was hardly unique to Mississippi. Charles
Ogletree notes that “[b]y 1964, only one-fiftieth of all southern black children
attended integrated schools.”
CHARLES OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 128 (2004).
16. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 129.
17. WILLIAM DOYLE, AN AMERICAN INSURRECTION: THE BATTLE OF OXFORD,
MISSISSIPPI, 1962, at 74–76 (2001). Considering the level of hysteria and violence at
these riots, it is miraculous that only two people died there and one or both may
have been killed by a stray bullet.
18. Martha Neil, 45 Years After Medgar Evers’ Murder, His Work Continues, A.B.A. J.,
June 12, 2008, http://abajournal.com/news/45_years_after_medgar_evers_murder
_his_work_continues. A few months later in November 1963, President John F.
Kennedy was assassinated in Houston, Texas. John Solomon, Scientists Cast Doubt on
Kennedy Bullet Analysis, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at A3.
19. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD 102–06 (James Melvin Washington, ed., Harper San Francisco
1992).
20. See Four Crosses Are Burned at Pascagoula, CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 26, 1964, at
3A. Pascagoula, Mississippi, is on the Gulf Coast.
21. See generally BELL, supra note 10, at 541–55 (discussing protest activities
occurring during the Civil Rights Movement).
22. WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 170.
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A. Burnside v. Byars in the District Court: Students Wearing Voting
Rights Buttons Create a “Disturbance”
Controversy and violence erupted in many local communities when
civil rights advocates sought to register African-Americans to vote or
demonstrated public support for such initiatives. During the summer
of 1964, the Council of Federated Organizations (“COFO”)
documented over 1000 arrests, 65 bombings or burning of buildings,
23
and at least 6 murders in retaliation for civil rights activism. In
Philadelphia, Mississippi these struggles occurred in the streets and
in the schools.
In summer 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil
24
Rights Act into law.
During what became known as “Freedom
Summer,” COFO mobilized hundreds of civil rights volunteers from
the North, mostly Whites, to register African-American voters
25
throughout the South. The number of registered African-American
voters in this region nearly doubled between 1960 (1.1 million) and
26
1964 (more than two million). Many volunteers became targets of
the massive resistance led by factions of the local White community.
One of these incidents was memorialized decades later in the movie
27
“Mississippi Burning” : on June 21, 1964, three Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”) volunteers—Michael Schwerner,
Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney—were arrested for speeding
while in Philadelphia, Mississippi to visit the site of an African28
American church that had been burned to the ground. After being
29
released from jail that evening, the three young men disappeared.
Almost six weeks later, their mutilated, decaying bodies were found
by FBI agents in a newly-constructed earthen dam near
30
31
Philadelphia.
All three young men had been shot.
The FBI’s
investigation of these murders would take several months, involve 258
23. See id. at 184 (disclosing the casualty statistics that resulted from the
Mississippi Summer Project).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
25. Inventory of the Ruth Schein/1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project
Collection, http://www.nypl.org/research/manuscripts/scm/scmgmfsp.xml (last
visited April 2, 2009).
26. Strong Negro Vote Big Aid to Lyndon, CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 27, 1964, at 1A.
27. See Rita Kempley, ‘Burning’: Potent but Problematic, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1988,
at C1 (reviewing the plot and cast of “Mississippi Burning”).
28. Mike Smith, Federal, State Grand Juries Push CR Murder Inquiries, CLARIONLEDGER, Sept. 23, 1964, at 1A. Schwerner, age twenty-four, and Goodman, age
twenty, were both White and from New York. Id. Chaney, age twenty-one, was
African-American and from nearby Meridian, Mississippi. Id.
29. Grand Jury Continuing in Biloxi, CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 24, 1964, at 1A.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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federal agents, and cost nearly $770 thousand—an expense amplified
32
Several of the
because of local obstruction of the investigation.
twenty-one men eventually indicted by the federal grand jury in
connection with the murders were local law enforcement officials,
33
including the county sheriff.
About six weeks after the bodies of Chaney, Schwerner, and
Goodman were found, the African-American principal of the
segregated, African-American high school in nearby Philadelphia
learned that “a number” of students were wearing buttons at his
34
school bearing the words “One Man One Vote” and “SNCC.” The
principal announced that these buttons could not be worn at school
because the buttons “didn’t have any bearing on [the students’]
education, would cause commotion, and would be disturbing [to] the
school program by taking up time trying to get order, passing them
around and discussing them in the classroom and explaining to the
35
next child why they are wearing them.”
Soon thereafter, on
Monday, September 21, 1964, three or four students wore SNCC
buttons at school and were sent home when they refused to remove
36
them. The next day, the students returned to school without the
37
buttons. Then, on Thursday, September 24, a larger demonstration
took place involving thirty to forty students wearing SNCC buttons; a
38
teacher described this event as causing “a commotion.” The main
newspaper in the state, Jackson’s Clarion-Ledger, reported that “some
39
50 [students were] suspended” as a result of wearing these buttons.
Previously, students had worn buttons referring to the Beatles and
40
to their own romantic relationships (“His” and “Hers”).
Nonetheless, when the students were disciplined for wearing the
SNCC buttons, the principal’s letter to the parents stated “‘[i]t is
32. FBI Director Tells Expense of Neshoba Murder Probe, CLARION-LEDGER, May 18,
1965, at 1A.
33. William L. Chaze, Federals Won’t Cooperate: No Indictments in Neshoba, CLARIONLEDGER, Feb. 5, 1965, at 1A. With this background, it may not seem surprising that
the federal investigators were instructed to not share information with local officials
until the federal prosecutions had finished, even when the Neshoba County grand
jury subpoenaed FBI officials. Katzenbach Believes Data Will Result in Indictments,
CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 28, 1964, at 1A. The Neshoba County grand jury did not
issue any indictments and placed blame for its lack of indictments at the feet of the
“federals” due to their failure to share information. Chaze, supra.
34. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1966).
35. Id. at 746–47 (internal formatting omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 747.
38. Id.
39. Sue for School Button-Wearing Permit in State, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 2, 1964, at
1B.
40. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746 n.2.
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against the school policy for anything to be brought into the school
41
that is not educational.’” Although the principal’s statement clearly
was an inaccurate reflection of school policy, it is difficult to see how
he—an African-American in Philadelphia, Mississippi—could have
acted otherwise. If he had permitted a substantial number of AfricanAmerican students to wear SNCC buttons in school, the reaction
from the African-American community probably would have been
privately mixed, but publicly quiet. And, the White community likely
would have reacted with hostility at best and violence visited upon the
42
principal and his family at worst. The state of Mississippi still funded
White supremacist organizations, and clearly law enforcement in the
43
Philadelphia area was no friend to African-Americans.
Yet despite the risks of retaliation from the White community and a
potentially hostile judiciary, two African-American parents filed suit
on September 25, 1964 on behalf of their children and the class of
affected children, seeking to overturn the suspensions as resulting
44
from an unconstitutional policy. The Complaint alleged that the
principal suspended the students pursuant to a school board policy
“which provides for the expulsion and/or suspension of all students
who display freedom insignia upon their clothing” and that the
suspensions violated the students’ First Amendment speech rights as
well as their Fifth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
45
Amendment rights. The handwritten notes of the district court
judge suggest that he viewed the complaint as alleging racial
46
discrimination—a charge for which he saw no supporting evidence.
On October 21 of the same year the district court, the Honorable
41. Id. at 747 n.4.
42. See KLUGER, supra note 14, at 300–01 (noting that a White federal district
court judge who found in favor of plaintiffs in a voting rights case was subjected to
“vicious mail” and “obscene phone calls,” and that “[o]n the street, the whites cut
him dead,” “[y]oungsters taunted his wife, and grown-ups would occasionally block
her passage,” “[s]omeone planted a flaming cross on [his] lawn,” and concrete was
thrown at his home); id. at 381 (describing White school administrators’ control over
African-American teachers); id. at 394 (discussing the lack of support for the filing of
Brown among the African-American community in Topeka); id. at 396 (indicating
that “white anger the suit would likely arouse”); see also WOODWARD, supra note 10, at
vi (describing African-Americans’ ambivalence towards civil rights struggles).
43. See WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 173 (“[Mississippi’s] Negroes lived in
constant fear and its whites under rigid conformity to dogmas of white supremacy as
interpreted by a state-subsidized Citizens Council.”).
44. Sue for School Button-Wearing Permit in State, supra note 39.
45. Complaint at 2, Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 1964)
(order denying preliminary injunction), rev’d, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). The
United Press International described the complaint as initiating a free speech case.
Sue for School Button-Wearing Permit in State, supra note 39.
46. Handwritten notes of Judge Mize, Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D.
Miss. Oct. 14, 1964).
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47

Sidney Mize presiding, heard plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary
restraining order as well as a preliminary injunction and denied
48
both. Judge Mize delivered an oral opinion from the bench on that
day, finding that the buttons had created a disturbance, the
restriction of the buttons was reasonable, and the restriction was
49
“reasonably necessary to maintain proper discipline in the school.”
The order denying the preliminary injunction was entered into the
50
record a few weeks later.
The day after the district court opinion was issued, the news was
51
first-page, above-the-fold in the Clarion-Ledger. The headline read
“Philly School Upheld In Federal Court Here: May Forbid Students
52
With Freedom Buttons.” Despite the region’s White hostility to the
Civil Rights Movement, the article was an example of standard
professional journalism, presenting a fairly neutral recounting of the
53
facts of the dispute and the court’s opinion.
B. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education in the District
Court: Students’ Voting Rights Button-Wearing and Accompanying Action Is
“Insubordinate”
Civil rights activism and accompanying controversy in Mississippi
was not confined either to the town of Philadelphia or to its schools.
Around the same time as the three civil rights workers’ murder near
Philadelphia, at least fifteen bombings related to “racial tensions”

47. The federal district court judge, the Honorable Sidney Mize, who ordered
James Meredith admitted to “Ole Miss” (under the direction of the Fifth Circuit on
remand), ordered three of the four integrated school districts to admit AfricanAmerican students into White schools and decided one of the civil rights student
speech cases, Burnside v. Byars. Before his tenure on the federal bench, Judge Mize
had served on the local school board for eight years. Mize Funeral Set Tuesday,
CLARION-LEDGER, Apr. 27, 1965, at 1A. Interestingly, Judge Mize’s hostility to
integration was well-known and documented in at least one of his judicial opinions.
See Thomas Jackson, The Fight Against Integration, AM. RENAISSANCE, Mar. 2006, at 7
(recalling Judge Mize’s negative reaction to the Supreme Court’s stance in favor of
integration).
48. Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 1964) (order denying
preliminary injunction), rev’d, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
49. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 8. Neither the district court
archives nor the Fifth Circuit archives have any record of the oral opinion; aside
from the quotations provided in the parties’ appellate briefs, it appears lost to
history.
50. Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 1964) (order denying
preliminary injunction), rev’d, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
51. William Chaze, Philly School Upheld in Federal Court Here: May Forbid Students
with Freedom Buttons, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 9, 1964, at 1A.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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occurred in McComb, a small town in southwestern Mississippi.
Across the state, thirty-six African-American churches were bombed
55
During October 1964, eighteen
or burned during 1964.
congressmen wrote an open letter to the President expressing grave
concern about the political climate in the Deep South. The AP
described the letter as communicating that “law and order in
Mississippi have broken down in a wave of violence, terror and
56
intimidation.” The letter said, “[t]here is no protection afforded
those engaged in civil rights activity,’” and called for “a massive
permanent increase” in the number of FBI agents assigned to the
area as well as a federal grand jury to investigate “the possible
connections between law enforcement officials and the bombings
57
and other acts of violence in southwest Mississippi.”
About 150 miles north of the McComb area devastated by
bombings, Rolling Fork, Mississippi was another community in which
African-American students wore SNCC voting rights buttons to their
segregated, African-American public high school. The Rolling Fork
58
students had worn these buttons previously without comment, but
on Friday, January 29, 1965, the principal asked some of the students
to remove their buttons toward the end of the day after he became
aware they were talking loudly in the hallway during class time,
59
presumably about the buttons. The weekend passed and about 150
60
students wore SNCC buttons to school on Monday, February 1.
Some of these students also distributed buttons in the hallway and
pinned buttons on their classmates—activities reportedly resulting in
61
“a general breakdown of orderly discipline.”
The principal
54. William L. Chaze, McComb’s Mob, Bombings like Bus Line, Puzzling, CLARIONLEDGER, Sept. 27, 1964, at 3D. An incident in late September, 1964 was typical: an
African-American family’s home was bombed and in response, a group of AfricanAmericans gathered at the site, described in the Clarion-Ledger as “a mob that easily
could have developed into a riot” and “a milling, angry crowd of about 300 Negroes.”
Id. The local authorities attempted to disperse the mob and made numerous arrests.
Id. U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach remarked “[t]here have been a
number of bombings. Negro homes have been bombed and then Negroes have
been arrested, creating a very dangerous situation.” Katzenbach Believes Data Will
Result in Indictments, supra note 33.
55. Austin Scott, No Clear-Cut Wins Seen for CR Cases, CLARION-LEDGER, May 17,
1965, at 5A.
56. Congressmen Ask Federal Action for Mississippi, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 6, 1964, at
3A.
57. Id.
58. Consolidated Brief of Appellants on Appeal at 6, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744 (5th Cir. 1966), Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th
Cir. 1966) (Nos. 22,681, 22,712).
59. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 750–51 (5th Cir.
1966); Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 3–4.
60. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751–52.
61. Id. at 751.
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informed the students they could not wear the buttons at school
because the students and their buttons “were creating such confusion
62
in the classrooms and in the corridor.” (Also on February 1, almost
300 miles to the northeast, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and nearly 300
marchers in Selma, Alabama were arrested and jailed because of their
nonviolent protest of Selma’s refusal to register African-American
63
voters.)
64
The next day, Tuesday, February 2, nearly 200 students wore
SNCC buttons to school in Rolling Fork and were again informed
65
that they could not wear the buttons in school. The day after that,
66
127 students wore the buttons to school and those who declined to
take off the buttons were summarily suspended for not following
67
school rules. Before driving the suspended students home, a bus
driver went into the school building and started handing out a box
full of SNCC buttons, at one point entering a classroom where class
68
was in session. At the same time, some students threw buttons into
the school through open windows and others tried to pin buttons on
69
their classmates. More students were suspended for wearing SNCC
70
buttons in the days that followed. About three weeks later, around
300 students of all ages were still suspended, not attending school
71
because the ban on SNCC buttons remained in place. At that point,
72
the school district suspended them for the rest of the year. As in
Burnside, the principal of this African-American high school was
African-American himself, and like the principal in Burnside, this
62. Id. at 751, 751 n.3 .
63. The nearly fifty children who participated in this march on February 1 and
carried “freedom signs” were taken into custody but not charged. Selma Arrest of King
Part of CR Drive Plan: Also Will Seek Seating in Alabama Legislature, CLARION-LEDGER,
Feb. 2, 1965, at 1A. The following day, hundreds more marched in the streets of
Selma to protest Dr. King’s arrest. Several hundred of these were students absent
from school for the purpose of protesting; local law enforcement agents took the
students into custody and charged them with juvenile delinquency. Hundreds Arrested
in Voter Campaign, CLARION-LEDGER, Feb. 3, 1965, at 1A. More than 2000 AfricanAmericans were taken into custody over the course of a few days in Selma. President
Indignant over Voting Denials, CLARION-LEDGER, Feb. 5, 1965, at 1A.
Dr. King was a notable figure by 1965, having only the prior year become the
youngest person ever honored with a Nobel Peace Prize. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at
138–39.
64. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 7.
65. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751; Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra
note 58, at 7.
66. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 7.
67. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751.
68. Id. at 752.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

1140

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1129

principal likely faced potentially violent retaliation from the local
White community if he was seen as nurturing support for voting
rights, especially among impressionable children.
Several days later on April 1, 1965, a small group of Rolling Fork,
73
Mississippi parents represented by the NAACP filed suit.
They
contested the suspension of their children for wearing SNCC buttons,
disputed the segregation of the school system, and sought a
74
preliminary injunction on both counts. The district court did not
hear the preliminary injunction motion until May 10. The next day,
it denied the motion as it applied to the 125 then-still-suspended
75
students. The two-page opinion identified the issue squarely as a
disciplinary problem:
[T]he children seek to defy the school authorities and ignore their
instructions and be given a decisive voice in the management of
the school. That is not and never has been the law and will never
be even good common sense so long as public schools continue to
76
merit their cost of operation.

The district court determined that the school rule was not
“unreasonable or oppressive” and emphasized the importance of
77
courts deferring to school authorities in student discipline matters.
It did not decide the case based on the disruption created but on the
78
“insubordination” of violating a rule.
Thus, the students’
disobedience was the district court’s focus, whether that disobedience
had negatively affected the school environment or not. Students’
ability to engage in non-disruptive speech about some of the most
important political issues of the day remained at the school’s mercy.
Interestingly, two days after issuing that decision upholding the
school’s disciplinary decisions, the district court granted plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction regarding the other claim in the
case, thus enjoining the system of de jure school segregation in
79
Rolling Fork.
73. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 9.
74. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 5–6.
75. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., No. 1096(W), slip op. at 1 (S.D.
Miss. May 11, 1965), aff’d, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Consolidated Brief for
Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 10. The record does not explain the
discrepancy between the numbers of students suspended for the duration of the
school year: 125 or 300. Presumably some students were allowed to return to school
without their SNCC buttons.
76. Blackwell, No. 1096(W), slip op. at 2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 10. Although the district
court’s decision in Burnside upholding the school’s right to restrict students from
wearing SNCC buttons made front-page, above-the-fold news in the Clarion-Ledger,
news about the filing of Blackwell and the district court’s denial of the preliminary
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During this time, the broader Civil Rights Movement continued to
make progress, but not without meeting wild resistance in the streets
which made the use of school authority to suppress students’ clamor
for civil rights look almost de minimis by contrast. On March 7, 1965,
Alabama police used billy clubs, tear gas, and nightsticks to injure
more than 600 unarmed voting rights marchers as they marched in
Selma, Alabama; this event was later to become known as “Bloody
80
Sunday.”
Eighteen days later, Dr. King and hundreds of other
protesters completed what should have been a four-day march from
81
Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery.
C. The Fifth Circuit: Burnside and Blackwell Consolidated
In both Burnside and Blackwell, plaintiffs appealed the district
courts’ denial of injunctive relief. Because the cases presented the
same legal issue, the Fifth Circuit granted plaintiffs’ motion to
82
consolidate the two cases. Thus, the two appeals were briefed and
argued together, and decided by the same panel.
1.

The actual disruption test emerges: one case affirmed, one case reversed
On appeal before the Fifth Circuit, the students presented two
arguments contending the district courts committed reversible error.
First, the students argued that the district court did not consider their
free speech rights when evaluating whether the schools’ regulations
83
were reasonable. Second, they contended that student speech could
only be restricted under the clear and present danger test, which had
84
not been satisfied in either case. By contrast, the school districts
rejected the notion that the students had any free speech rights in
public schools whatsoever and instead framed the issue as merely “a
matter dealing with the question of reasonableness of school
85
authorities in maintaining proper discipline within the school.” The
parties’ arguments framed the clash between the old approach and
injunction was absent from that same paper. Review by author of the Clarion Ledger
Feb. 1–5, 1965; Apr. 23–27, 1965; May 11–19, 1965.
80. Letter from a Birmingham Jail (April 16, 1963), in KING, supra note 19, at 83;
We Shall Overcome—Selma-to-Montgomery March, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/
civilrights/al4.htm (last visited April 2, 2009).
81. We Shall Overcome—Selma-to-Montgomery March, supra note 80.
82. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 752 (5th Cir.
1966); see also Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that the
two cases had been consolidated for briefing and presentation). This consolidation
increased judicial efficiency and also made it easier for the NAACP to provide legal
support in both cases.
83. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 11.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 8.
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the new, between students as obedient subjects of the school who
could be disciplined for insubordination regardless of the validity of
the rule they were violating, and students as citizens in a political
body, entitled to limited protection for their peaceful protest and
legitimate dissent even within the schoolhouse gates.
With these cases, the Fifth Circuit was entering new territory. The
Supreme Court had held in 1943 in West Virginia Board of Education v.
86
Barnette that students could not be required to participate in the flag
salute in public schools. The analysis in Barnette, however, was
convoluted and the Court did not make clear in its opinion whether
Barnette was a free speech case, a free exercise case, some sort of
political establishment case, or whether it fit into multiple
87
categories.
Furthermore, Barnette involved a student’s right to
refrain from engaging in compelled speech, quite a different
question from the freedom to affirmatively express one’s own possibly
88
controversial opinions.
Regardless of these limitations, though,
Barnette did provide authority for the limited proposition that
elementary and secondary students could be constitutional rights89
holders, a disputed issue at that point in time.
86. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
87. See Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students’ Religious Speech and Viewpoint
Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 197 (2007) (noting that Barnette was decided
without use of clear test); Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases,
44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 341–42 n.56 (2008) (arguing deductively that Barnette was a
free speech case even though “the Court did not expressly ground its decision in the
Free Speech Clause”); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990)
(describing Barnette as “decided exclusively upon free speech grounds” despite
absence of explicit free exercise analysis), superseded in part by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act did not disturb Smith's characterization of Barnette, rather it
reinstated the "compelling interest test" to determine whether a law ostensibly
neutral on religion nevertheless imposes a substantial burden on a person's exercise
of religion. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141
88. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631–34. An Arizona district court applied Barnette in a
case involving Jehovah’s Witness children who declined to stand for the singing of
the national anthem and were suspended for insubordination. But, the district court
went further than merely applying Barnette; it overturned the suspensions in part
because “it appears that the conduct of the pupils involved here was not disorderly
and did not materially disrupt the conduct and discipline of the school, and since
there is a lack of substantial evidence that it will do so in the future.” Sheldon v.
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963). The test in this case may have
influenced the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Blackwell and Burnside, but it was not cited
in either decision.
See also Theodore F. Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 41, n.39 (1969) (describing Barnette as a situation involving a
“very limited sectarian interest” in contrast with “the right of the ‘general’ student” in
Tinker).
89. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects the
citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures . . . . These have, of course,
important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for
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Thus laying in place an important and controversial premise, the
Fifth Circuit agreed with the students’ foundational claim that they
91
held First Amendment affirmative speech rights in public schools.
The Fifth Circuit then moved quickly to limit the scope of those
rights, turning to two non-student Supreme Court cases to support
the claim that free speech rights “can be abridged by state officials if
their protection of legitimate state interests necessitates [such] an
92
invasion.”
The Fifth Circuit also set forth basic principles for
analyzing the validity of a restriction on students’ speech: “The
interests which the regulation seeks to protect must be fundamental
93
and substantial if there is to be a restriction of speech” and the state
has “a legitimate and substantial interest in the orderly conduct of
94
the school.”
Turning to the specific speech in Burnside and Blackwell, the Fifth
Circuit determined that merely wearing a political button was not
“inherently distract[ing]” speech inclined to “break down the
regimentation of the classroom such as carrying banners, scattering
95
leaflets, [or] speechmaking.” Furthermore, in Burnside, because the
other students in the school expressed only “mild curiosity” in the
SNCC buttons, prohibiting the buttons was not necessary to maintain
order. Thus, the speech restriction in Burnside was “arbitrary and
unreasonable,” an unjustifiable infringement on the students’ First
96
Amendment rights. Making clear the factual distinction between
Burnside and Blackwell, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that “the mere
presence of ‘freedom buttons’ is [not] calculated to cause a
disturbance sufficient to warrant their exclusion from school
97
premises unless there is some student misconduct involved.”

citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”).
90. Denno, supra note 88, at 36 (stating, “[i]t is reasonable to assert that prior to
the Tinker decision the primary freedom in public schools had been that of
administrators from judicial interference”).
91. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 747–48 (5th Cir. 1966).
92. Id. at 748 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 510 (1951), and Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)).
93. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir.
1966).
94. See id. (emphasizing that “[t]he proper operation of public school systems is
one of the highest and most fundamental responsibilities of the state”). Further, in
Burnside, the court defined the state interest as “maintaining an educational system.”
Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748.
95. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748.
96. Id. As such, the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 748–49.
97. Id. at 748.
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It was this factual distinction that would allow the Fifth Circuit to
reach opposite outcomes in these two cases. Accordingly, in Blackwell,
the Fifth Circuit looked to the students’ conduct in aggressively
distributing the buttons as the source of “a complete breakdown in
98
school discipline.” The court emphasized the need for schools to be
able to discipline “the distribution, pinning, and throwing of
buttons,” the “discourteous remarks to school personnel,” “the
deliberate absence of a student from class,” and the “loud
conversation in halls and corridors which c[ould] be heard in
99
classrooms.” Only because the students’ conduct was “so inexorably
tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable” did
the Fifth Circuit determine that the prohibition of the buttons, and
thereby the message, was reasonable and the limitation of the
100
students’ First Amendment rights constitutional.
Yet, even while
the Fifth Circuit upheld the schools’ actions in Blackwell, it cautioned
school officials to “be careful in their monitoring of student
expression in circumstances in which such expression does not
101
substantially interfere with the operation of the school.” Consistent
with Burnside, nowhere in Blackwell did the Fifth Circuit hold that a
school must be able to prohibit the mere wearing of a button—even a
102
civil rights button worn in the Deep South during the mid-1960s.
Derrick Bell’s description of the social context emphasizes the radical
nature of the Fifth Circuit’s approach: “From the viewpoint of a great
many Whites, there really were no peaceful, nondisruptive civil rights
protests. Each represented a most threatening challenge to an
103
important aspect of the local status quo.”
2.

Noteworthy aspects of these two cases and their context
Before turning to the cases that incorporated Burnside and Blackwell
in the few years after they were issued, three aspects of these two cases
deserve mention. First, the closest the Fifth Circuit came to
considering the disruptive potential of other students’ reactions to
the specific message expressed by the speakers was the court’s explicit
references to “freedom buttons” in Burnside and Blackwell. In
hindsight, the buttons’ disruptive potential seems much greater than
98. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 753.
99. Id. These were the disruptive activities, the “unusual degree of commotion,
boisterous conduct, a collision with the rights of others, an undermining of
authority, and a lack of order, discipline and decorum.” Id. at 754.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 753.
103. BELL, supra note 10, at 555.
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the court implied: in Burnside, African-American students were
wearing voting rights buttons in a community where the murdered
bodies of three voting rights workers had been unearthed six weeks
earlier—after the murders were covered up by White local law
104
enforcement officials. Furthermore, the bombings and other racemotivated violence across the state of Mississippi at that time make
clear that those three murders were not isolated incidents of racial
violence and the community out of which Blackwell arose presumably
105
was racially charged as well.
Perhaps the court considered the
disruptive potential lessened somewhat because the schools were
entirely segregated, and while that might have reduced the potential
for immediate disruption, it could not negate it entirely—it would be
impossible to completely isolate the students, teachers, and principal
from the unstable and explosive racial context in which they lived.
But more importantly in a precedential sense, the Fifth Circuit’s
lack of emphasis on the disruptive potential of the specific message
led to a stronger focus on the time, place, and manner of the conduct
alone. Because Tinker did not adopt that same focus, the decision in
Tinker led to a series of difficult and problematic questions including
uncertainty about how student speech restrictions square with the
First Amendment’s general presumption against viewpoint
106
discrimination, and the role of the so-called heckler’s veto in
107
Indeed, it
assessing the level of actual or anticipated disruption.
was the presence of disruptive conduct by the speakers themselves in
Blackwell but not Burnside that led the Fifth Circuit to different
conclusions in these two cases—not the message itself or the
responsive speech or conduct of others.

104. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
106. See Bowman, supra note 87, at 202, for a discussion of these issues. See also id.
(stating that “the focus of . . . [Tinker’s] disruption test and the Court’s subsequent
language clarifying that test are consistent with the idea that one particular
perspective could cause a level and type of disruption sufficient to justify quashing it
in what would amount to viewpoint discrimination”); John Taylor, Why Student
Religious Speech Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223, 234 (2007) (arguing that Tinker does
not require regulation on students’ speeches to have “viewpoint-neutral effects”).
107. Berkman, supra note 3, at 591–92; Taylor, supra note 106, at 231; see also John
Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming Mar.
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1137909
(“[F]orty years of applying Tinker have not made clear the degree to which Tinker
allows schools to engage in a heckler’s veto, and the lack of a clear judicial
commitment to the no-heckler’s-veto principle creates unacceptable high risks that
schools may be engaging in purposeful viewpoint discrimination.”).
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Second, aside from citing one another, Burnside and Blackwell
108
The
relied on no other authority for the actual disruption test.
Fifth Circuit’s focus on conduct and actual disruption in these two
cases could have been influenced by any number of cases or
common-sense approaches. Speculating about what the judges would
have known or learned through their own research is difficult, but
one area of law almost certainly familiar to the Fifth Circuit judges
would have been the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in civil rights
protest cases occurring in non-school settings within the Fifth
Circuit’s boundaries. Between December 1961 and February 1966
the Supreme Court reversed convictions of four individuals charged
with violating Louisiana’s breach of peace statute for activities the
109
Court described as non-violent civil rights protests. In all four cases,
the Court emphasized the non-disruptive nature of the protesters’
110
This
actions, by which it often seemed to mean non-violent.
approach was not new: the Court had used disruption and violence
111
as touchstones in other protest cases as well.
To the extent the Fifth Circuit understood Burnside and Blackwell as
civil rights protest cases which happened to occur in schools,
employing a focus on disruption would have been logical. The two
Fifth Circuit judges and the district court judge sitting by designation
in Burnside and Blackwell also would have been aware of the Fifth
Circuit’s intensely controversial decisions supporting voting rights
and school desegregation, and the riots and violent protests staged in
112
response to those decisions and their implementation. Compared
108. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir.
1966).
109. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 (1966) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965), Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962), and Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961)).
110. See id. (“In each, the purpose of the participants was to protest the denial to
Negroes of rights guaranteed them by state and federal constitutions and to petition
their governments for redress of grievances. In none was there evidence that the
participants planned or intended disorder. In none were there circumstances which
might have led to a breach of the peace chargeable to the protesting participants.”).
111. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235–36 (1963) (stating that
petitioners had peacefully expressed their grievances); Cox, 379 U.S. at 549
(reversing defendant’s conviction because students’ actions did not constitute a
breach of peace, and thereby, students themselves were not violent). By contrast, the
Court was much less likely to even grant certiorari to, let alone reverse, cases with
similar legal issues but with facts including disruption or disorder. BELL, supra note
10, at 549.
112. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 19 (Univ. Ala. Press 1990) (1981) (noting
that civil rights cases comprised just less than three percent of the Fifth Circuit’s case
load around this time, but these cases were some of the Circuit’s most high-profile).
See generally supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text; infra Part (II)(A) (discussing
the elementary, secondary, university-level school desegregation decisions). The
Fifth Circuit’s voting rights cases included Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
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to the public reaction to some of those decisions, the practical
consequences of allowing limited, silent, peaceful student speech
about civil rights through Burnside and Blackwell’s actual disruption
test must have seemed much less dramatic.
Finally, the Clarion Ledger was generally aware of the Fifth Circuit’s
activities and often covered its new decisions; on July 22, 1966, it
reprinted an Associated Press story describing a Fifth Circuit decision
issued the same day as Blackwell and Burnside holding “that Negroes
must be represented on jury lists at least in proportion to their
113
population.” Coverage of the Fifth Circuit’s opinions in the student
speech cases was absent from Mississippi’s principal newspaper,
however, which instead prominently featured a portrait of life in an
unchanging South. A photograph of two genteel White women who,
the caption explains, are leading “the second annual Workshop for
Dynamic Living,” captured approximately one-fourth of the front
114
page the day after Blackwell and Burnside were decided.
Thus, the story of Burnside and Blackwell is not merely a tale of
students who broke the school’s rules. Rather, it is a story of AfricanAmerican students allied with their parents against the oppression of
dominant White society in the form of the school, speaking out in the
Deep South in pursuit of racial justice, seeking the rights accorded to
citizens. This is the legal and social foundation on which Tinker was
built.

1966); United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Dogan, 314
F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1963); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959), rev’d
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Circuit Judge Gewin participated in fewer of these cases than most of his
colleagues, and Circuit Judge Thornberry even less, but both of these judges who
decided Burnside and Blackwell eventually became known as part of the Circuit’s
“liberal wing” on school desegregation cases. See BASS, supra note 112, at 160, 304
(noting that “[Gewin] eventually joined in what became the liberal wing of the court
in important school cases in the early 1970s” and that “Thornberry identified with
the liberal bloc on the Fifth Circuit”). Two years after deciding Burnside and
Blackwell, Gewin wrote the Circuit’s en banc decision in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises,
interpreting broadly the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 394 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 1968).
113. Jury List Must Include Names of Negro Citizens, CLARION-LEDGER, July 22, 1966, at
1A.
114. Dynamic Living, CLARION-LEDGER, July 22, 1966, at 1A. The caption is dwarfed
by the accompanying picture of Mrs. J.H. Bowden and Miss Scott Young, who appear
perched on the edge of a reflecting pool with their legs crossed demurely at the
ankle. Columns frame the pastoral background. Id. Specifically, the caption noted:
“Miss Young, who will be a freshman music major at Belhaven [College] beginning in
September . . . was among the top five beauties [at Murrah High School] and was
selected most dignified and most talented in dramatics,” and Mrs. Bowden is “an
assistant professor of speech at Belhaven.” Id.; see also KLUGER, supra note 14, at 394
(claiming that in Topeka, Kansas, and presumably elsewhere, newspapers “gave very
little coverage to black affairs in general.”).
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II. THE ROAD FROM “ACTUAL DISRUPTION” TO “SUBSTANTIAL AND
MATERIAL DISRUPTION OR REASONABLE ANTICIPATION THEREOF”
In Burnside and Blackwell the Fifth Circuit concluded that students
held limited First Amendment free speech rights in schools and those
rights could be curtailed if the students’ speech caused actual
115
disruption of the educational environment.
This test did not ask
whether school officials had reasonably anticipated that speech about
a certain issue would cause disruption when enacting a prior
restraint-type of regulation (eventually, that consideration would be
part of Tinker’s ultimate holding), but examined only the actual
impact of the speech on the school environment with a focus on the
116
speakers’ conduct.
The actual disruption test affected the
development of the law within the Fifth Circuit and beyond its
borders; twelve cases nationwide cited Burnside and Blackwell before
the Supreme Court decided Tinker in February 1969.
Of those twelve cases, five arose out of public high schools and the
remaining seven began in colleges or universities, where student
protest already was a more common occurrence than in high
117
schools.
Many courts took liberties with the Fifth Circuit’s test,
restricting its scope even as they purported to apply it, and others
cited it for general principles such as the importance of deferring to
school authorities, which was in fact not its primary focus. Only
rarely was the Fifth Circuit’s test applied in a manner true to the
original. In this nearly three-year window after the Burnside and
Blackwell decisions and before Tinker, a mere two out of twelve cases
overturned schools’ disciplinary decisions; both of those involved
institutions of higher education.
A. A Retreat from Actual Disruption in Secondary School Cases
Throughout the 1960s, high school students were involved in civil
rights protests across the South, some of which resulted in litigation
challenging the arrest and conviction of protesters—but those
118
protests rarely occurred on high school campuses.
As a result of
115. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
117. The following five cases were filed on behalf of students of public school:
Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Brown
v. Geer, 296 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988
(N.D. Ill. 1968), rev’d, 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970); Akin v. Bd. of Educ. Unified Sch.
Dist., 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
118. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 231 (1963) (discussing the involvement of high school students in
protests in public spaces).
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119

those circumstances and other factors, the body of reported preTinker high school student speech decisions is very small. Of the five
cases citing Burnside and Blackwell, three involved students’ violation
of school rules regarding appearance, such as hairstyle or facial hair,
one involved an underground newspaper, and the last was Tinker.
Until the Supreme Court decided Tinker, all of the trial and appellate
courts deciding these five cases upheld the discipline and quashed
the students’ speech claims. Then, in Tinker, the Supreme Court
reversed the district and appellate courts’ decisions below. Tinker
also caused an appellate court to reverse one of the other four high
school student speech cases.
The Fifth Circuit was home to two cases in which male students
were suspended or denied enrollment because of their “long”
haircuts reminiscent of the Beatles’ shaggy coifs. Not surprisingly, in
120
both of those cases, Davis v. Firment and Ferrell v. Dallas Independent
121
School District, courts purported to apply the circuit rule as stated in
122
Burnside and Blackwell. Burnside and Blackwell were also employed as
persuasive authority in a California state court case with similar facts,
123
Akin v. Board of Education, in which a court upheld the suspension
124
Yet, in all three of these
of a student for wearing a beard.
grooming-related cases, a school principal’s vague recollection of
disruption when other students in previous years sported “long” hair
or beards was sufficient to justify the existence and enforcement of
the rule, regardless of any actual disruption resulting from the
125
grooming choice in question. Despite their claimed reliance on the
Burnside/Blackwell
standard,
these
courts
evaluated
the
reasonableness of the regulation not by the restrictive
Burnside/Blackwell test of actual disruption, but rather by a test
119. See supra notes 113–117 and accompanying text.
120. 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), aff’d, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969).
121. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
122. Davis, 269 F. Supp. at 527 (noting that the lower court in Davis cited only
Burnside for the proposition that the disruption of the school environment justifies
discipline). The court also noted that a hairstyle does not constitute expression, and
even if it did, it can be regulated by reasonable state rules. Id.; see also Ferrell, 392 F.2d
at 703 (citing both Burnside and Blackwell).
123. 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Ct. App. 1968).
124. Id. at 559. Akin cites both Burnside and Blackwell for the actual disruption
standard. Id. at 562.
125. Davis, 269 F. Supp. at 528–29; see Ferrell, 392 F.2d at 699, 700–01 (observing
that the principal’s opinion was “that the length and style of the boys’ hair would
cause commotion, trouble, distraction and a disturbance in the school” based on past
events at the school); Akin, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562–63 (holding that even though the
student’s beard did not cause disruption at a private school, and another student
wore a beard at a different public school without causing disruption, the principal’s
recollection of past disruption was sufficient).
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implicitly more in line with the one the Supreme Court eventually
would employ in Tinker, focusing on whether disruption reasonably
126
could be anticipated.
Burnside also was cited as persuasive authority in Scoville v. Board of
127
Education of Joliet Township High School District 204, an Illinois case in
which students circulated copies of a sixty-page underground
128
newspaper/literary journal.
The district court found that the
journal was not disruptive but the school could prohibit its
distribution on school grounds because the journal encouraged
students to disobey school rules, employed “inappropriate and
129
indecent language,”
and criticized school policies as
“propaganda”—all particularly undesirable actions inside the
130
schoolhouse gate.
So, despite not satisfying the Burnside/Blackwell
test, the court held the newspaper could be prohibited for other
131
reasons.
Finally, in Tinker—the case factually most similar to Burnside and
Blackwell because of the students’ serious political speech—the
district court also invoked the Burnside/Blackwell focus on disruption.
However, it explicitly broadened the test to one in which schools also
could prohibit student speech if school officials reasonably
132
anticipated that the speech would cause such a disruption. As part
of a larger organized protest effort, five students (three later became
the Tinker plaintiffs) had worn black arm bands to school to protest

126. See Akin, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562–63 (examining experts’ opinions and
concluding that it is possible that male students that grow beards could cause
disruption in school). More recently, some cases involving students’ hairstyles have
been litigated as political or religious expression, but plaintiffs in those three early
cases made no such claims.
127. 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev’d, 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970).
128. Id. at 990.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 989–90, 992. “[A]lthough we are in a period when the rights of the
minor vis-à-vis the state are being closely reexamined, . . . the Supreme Court has
recently affirmed the right of the state to protect its younger citizens from certain
forms of speech which would, if the audience were adult, be protected by the First
Amendment.” Id. at 992 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). The Seventh Circuit reprinted the journal; although the
journal was disrespectful of authority, it did not contain language that was obscene
or an incitement to riot. Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joliet Twp. High Sch. Dist. 204,
425 F.2d 10, 13–14 (7th Cir. 1970).
131. Later, after the Supreme Court decided Tinker, the Seventh Circuit applied
Tinker to reverse the district court’s decision in Scoville and overturn the student
discipline. Scoville, 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970).
132. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(“[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact
occurred.”).
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133

the Vietnam War and call for a truce.
The students and their
parents knew this act would violate a newly enacted rule the school
district instituted based on its concern about the escalating violence
and confrontation of Vietnam protests and protest responses across
134
the country.
Before their suspension, the students were subjected
to a few hostile remarks in school hallways, but those incidents
seemed to be the limits of any actual disruption of the school
135
environment caused by the armbands.
The district court in Tinker deferred to school officials’ expertise
and set forth what it seemed to think was a fairly common-sense
conclusion: the topic of the Vietnam War was so controversial, and
such a common focus of student protest in colleges and universities,
that high school officials reasonably could expect that student speech
opposing the war would cause a substantial or material disruption of
136
the educational environment.
It further concluded that the three
student-plaintiffs’ black armbands fell into this category and, thus,
their suspensions from school were not unconstitutional, despite the
137
limited disruption caused by the armbands.
Accordingly, the
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim for which
138
relief could be granted. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
by a divided panel, and then affirmed again in a summary opinion of
139
the court en banc.
It was not until Tinker reached the Supreme
Court that the substantial and material disruption or reasonable

133. Id. at 504.
134. Id. at 510 n.4.
135. Id. at 508. According to the dissent, the students’ arm bands caused
somewhat greater disruption and distraction in the schools, including evidence that a
lesson in Mary Beth Tinker’s mathematics class was “wrecked” when she entered into
class with the armband. Id. at 517–18 (Black, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 513 (majority opinion) (“When [the student] is in the cafeteria, or on
the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, [the student] may
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
Vietnam . . . .”); see Michael R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The
Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 81 (1998) (discussing the effects of the
anti-Vietnam protest). “[B]y the time anti-Vietnam activists began to mobilize, civil
rights struggles in the South, as well as campaigns on behalf of other racial minorities
and women, had habituated Americans to social protest, making it part of the
cultural climate of the 1960s. Bold willingness to question and resist the government
was nothing new, nor were such dramatic techniques of protest as marching, sit-ins,
picketing, civil disobedience, and provoking arrest.” Id.
137. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972–73 (S.D.
Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
138. See id. at 973 (holding that school’s regulation did not deprive plaintiff of
constitutional right to freedom of speech, thus denying nominal damages and
injunction against school).
139. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967),
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

1152

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1129

anticipation thereof tests for student speech became a definitive part
140
of constitutional law.
Thus, in all five pre-Tinker high school student speech cases citing
Burnside and Blackwell, including Tinker itself at the trial and appellate
levels, the discipline was upheld. Although these other courts
purported to apply the Fifth Circuit’s actual disruption test, in reality
their opinions bore much more similarity to the district court
opinions in Burnside and Blackwell which considered students to be
mere disobedient subjects. Thus, the courts conveyed support for
students’ free speech rights and students’ citizenship in principle,
while continuing to grant great deference to schools, ultimately
141
rejecting students’ actual claims.
B. Higher Education Begins To Emerge as Distinct from the
Elementary/Secondary Context
The five cases discussed above are part of a small but critical mass
of cases brought in the late 1960s and early 1970s which started to
establish a body of free speech case law applicable specifically to
public high school students. In the three years before Tinker, the
Blackwell/Burnside rule also was invoked in seven cases arising out of
higher education institutions—two more cases than those arising out
of public secondary schools. For the most part, the courts deciding
the higher education cases were no more willing than the courts
deciding the high school cases to overturn schools’ disciplinary
decisions on the merits. Thus, deference to educational institutions
140. In the few years after Tinker was decided, courts and scholars debated
whether Tinker had created a “reasonable anticipation” test because the plain
language of the majority opinion did not explicitly say as much. The Court never
spoke on this matter again, but a consensus eventually emerged (whether based on
judicial interpretation or practical necessity) that Tinker does stand for a reasonable
anticipation test. See, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d
965, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (concluding that student speech at issue “falls well short
of the Tinker standard for reasonably anticipating a disruption of school activities”).
141. In Ferrell, a debate between the Fifth Circuit majority and a dissenting
captured the essence of the controversy primed for the Supreme Court in Tinker.
The majority wrote: “The interest of the state in maintaining an effective and
efficient school system is of paramount importance. That which so interferes or
hinders the state in providing the best education possible for its people, must be
eliminated or circumscribed as needed.” Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d
697, 703 (5th Cir. 1968). Judge Tuttle, dissenting in Ferrell, wrote: “[B]oth in . . .
[Blackwell] and upon the record before us here, we find courts too prone to permit a
curtailment of a constitutional right of a dissenter, because of the likelihood that it
will bring disorder, resistance or improper and even violent action by those
supporting the status quo. It seems to me it cannot be said too often that the
constitutional rights of an individual cannot be denied him because his exercise of
them produces violent reaction by those who would deprive him of the very rights he
seeks to assert.” Id. at 705 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
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was common in both sets of cases, yet the college students’ protests
arose out of a somewhat different history.
Even as far back as the late 1920s, college campuses had been the
142
site of civil rights protests at Fisk and Howard Universities. During
the 1960s, civil rights protests became especially common on college
and university campuses across the country, whose students were a
prominent force of the Civil Rights Movement. College and
university students took the lead in the Greensboro, North Carolina
143
144
lunch counter sit-ins; they were the “S” in SNCC; they gathered by
hundreds and thousands to protest racial injustice and the Vietnam
145
War on the campuses of Columbia, Berkeley, and countless other
universities. Sometimes the protesters were peaceful but their
messages provoked violent reactions in those who disagreed;
sometimes the protests were disruptive because of the time, place,
and manner in which they occurred; and sometimes the protesters
themselves turned violent. Regardless, protests on college campuses
were of a radically different nature than even the unwelcome buttonpinning and button-throwing in Blackwell.
Perhaps not surprisingly given this increased level of campus
protest, during this time college and university students were
contesting their suspension or expulsion for civil rights protests by
actively asserting their procedural due process rights. Accordingly,
when disciplinary decisions were reversed, such reversals were more
likely to be based on procedural due process grounds rather than
because students’ activities passed the Burnside/Blackwell actual
146
disruption test.
142. The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow: Fisk University Student Protests (1925–1927),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_fisk.html (last visited April 3,
2009).
143. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 15, at 495; WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 169.
144. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. See generally CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN
STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S, at 9–18 (1995)
(recounting the events that led up to the birth of SNCC); WOODWARD, supra note 10,
at 169 (discussing SNCC’s formation). SNCC was founded on the campus of Shaw
University.
145. See, e.g., MARK D. NAISON, WHITE BOY: A MEMOIR 80–96 (2002) (describing the
reaction and the subsequent demonstration of the black community of Columbia
University after King’s death).
146. See, e.g., Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 632 (W.D. Mo.
1968) (after the students were granted process in the form of a hearing, the school
arrived again at the same disciplinary decision as it reached before the hearing; this
time, because adequate process had occurred, the district court upheld the school’s
disciplinary decision); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 171 (W.D. Mo.
1968) (college students were suspended after staging a demonstration in the
cafeteria to protest the quality of the food; their suspensions were overturned due to
inadequate process); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288–89 (D. Colo. 1968)
(college students were suspended after protesting CIA recruitment and disrupting
the career services office; their suspensions were upheld as based on constitutional
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Of the seven higher education cases focusing exclusively on
student speech after Burnside and Blackwell were decided but before
the Supreme Court decided Tinker, five involved students’ political
protests and four of those five grew out of students’ civil rights
147
protests at African-American colleges in the South. Courts upheld
the schools’ disciplinary actions in all four of these civil rights protest
148
cases.
These decisions regularly cited Blackwell and Burnside,
emphasizing deference to school authorities: Zanders v. Louisiana
149
cited Burnside and Blackwell for the
State Board of Education
proposition that “[w]ithin our own circuit, the hesitancy of the
judiciary in questioning the wisdom of specific rules involved recently
150
151
has been expressed”; Evers v. Birdsong, from Mississippi, cited
Blackwell and the Tinker district court for the principle that university
officials “must be given wide discretion in anticipating and
preventing interruptions in the class room and student activities for
rules and resulting from appropriate procedural due process); Esteban v. Cent. Mo.
State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (students were suspended for
their participation in mass demonstrations resulting in property damage; their
suspensions were overturned due to inadequate process); Due v. Fla. A. & M. Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (students’ suspensions were upheld where
students received adequate process); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174,
182 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (Tennessee college students were suspended for
participating in Mississippi freedom rides; their suspensions were overturned due to
inadequate process); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 947–48, 949,
952 (C.D. Ala. 1960), rev’d, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (college students were
expelled for participating in civil rights demonstrations on and off campus; their
suspensions were overturned due to inadequate process); see also Greene v. Howard
Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 612–13 (D.D.C. 1967) (because Howard University is a
private corporation, it was not bound by the due process principles articulated in
Dixon and could provide notice of the procedures it intended to follow in its
academic catalogue).
In 1960, an Alabama district court affirmed a university’s suspension of nine “ring
leader[]” students who led civil rights demonstrations on campus and in the local
community. Dixon, 186 F. Supp. at 947–48, 949, 952. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that students had due process rights of notice and a hearing. Dixon, 294
F.2d at 159. Within a decade, Dixon was cited outside the circuit as “generally
accepted as correct” and “[t]he leading case involving . . . a disciplinary proceeding.”
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 236 (S.D. W. Va. 1968), aff’d, 399 F.2d 638 (4th
Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968), aff’d, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969). The U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri called for oral argument and entered a general order
regarding college and university student discipline due process rights, anticipating
that these questions “are likely to be presented in a substantial number of future
cases.” Scoggin, 291 F. Supp. at 163.
147. Zanders v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 750–52 (W.D. La. 1968);
Evers v. Birdsong, 287 F. Supp. 900, 901–03 (S.D. Miss. 1968); Jones, 279 F. Supp. at
195–96; Barker, 283 F. Supp. at 230–32.
148. Zanders, 281 F. Supp. at 762–63, 767; Evers, 287 F. Supp. at 906; Jones, 279 F.
Supp. at 204; Barker, 283 F. Supp. at 236.
149. 281 F. Supp. 747.
150. Id. at 758 n.26.
151. 287 F. Supp. at 900.
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152

which the school is operated.”
Outside the Fifth Circuit, Barker v.
153
154
Hardaway, from West Virginia, echoed this latter comment and
155
Jones v. State Board of Education, from Tennessee, cited Blackwell and
Burnside for the tenet that “provided the procedural requirements are
met, it is always within the province of school authorities to prohibit
by regulations acts calculated to undermine school discipline and to
156
punish when these regulations have been violated.”
As in the
secondary school cases, deference to school officials and
maintenance of social order were guiding principles for the courts.
Their society may have been in a racial uproar, but these courts were
not going to contribute to it by carving out any more room for
dissent.
157
In the fifth protest case, Soglin v. Kauffmann, students were
suspended after they interfered with on-campus interviews conducted
158
Not surprisingly, Soglin cited Burnside. But
by Dow Chemical.
rather than using Burnside to support the principle of deference to
school administrators as the other courts had, the district court cited
159
Burnside to emphasize the limitations of school’s authority. In this
way, with its focus on balancing students’ rights and schools’ need for
order, and its skepticism of the school’s decision, Soglin was a natural
precursor to Tinker. After reviewing numerous equal protection and
due process cases with student plaintiffs over the previous twenty
years, the district court in Soglin noted prophetically:
Underlying these developments in the relationship of academic
institutions to the courts has been a profound shift in the nature of
American schools and colleges and universities, and in the
relationships between younger and older people. These changes
seldom have been articulated in judicial decisions but they are
increasingly reflected there. The facts of life have long since
undermined the concepts, such as in loco parentis, which have been
invoked historically for conferring upon university authorities
160
virtually limitless disciplinary discretion.

152. Id. at 905.
153. 283 F. Supp. at 228.
154. Id. at 235.
155. Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff’d,
407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
156. Id. at 198. The district court in Jones also analogized the facts of the instant
case to those in Blackwell in which “[t]he record showed an unusual degree of
commotion, boisterous conduct, collision with the rights of others, and undermining
of authority as a result of the wearing of these buttons.” Id. at 204.
157. 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff’d, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
158. Id. at 982.
159. Id. at 987.
160. Id. at 987–88.
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The district court then invalidated the students’ suspensions as
impermissibly based on an unconstitutionally overbroad
161
“misconduct” provision and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal.
The Supreme Court would decide Tinker within a year of the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Soglin.
The final two higher education cases to cite Burnside and Blackwell
were from the Fifth Circuit and identified Burnside and Blackwell as
the circuit rule. Curiously, in Dickey v. Alabama State Board of
162
Education,
the district court applied the general principle of
Burnside and ordered that an expelled student be readmitted because
no disruption would result from the readmission rather than
analyzing whether the alleged offense had created an actual
163
disruption.
In a similarly creative manner, the district court in
164
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University used Burnside
and Blackwell to support the school’s claim in a search and seizure
case that “‘[r]egulations and rules which are necessary in maintaining
order and discipline” in a school program “are always considered
165
reasonable.”
Perhaps unknown to any of the litigants or judges in these cases,
the district court judge in Burnside had commented in his oral
opinion:
If this regulation were in an institution of higher learning, there
might be some weight to be given to the argument that has been
made that this is an individual and constructive method of raising
discussions that could be and ought to be to aid education in a
college or university where the students have reached higher
166
maturity.

While this statement eventually would become an accurate
reflection of the division between elementary/secondary and higher
education student speech cases, only one of the many courts hearing
these seven higher education cases shortly before Tinker adopted a
similar approach.
In sum, all twelve of these student speech cases (those from
colleges and universities as well as those from high schools) were
working their way through the courts more or less at the same time.
161. Id. at 996.
162. 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), appeal held in abeyance, 394 F.2d 490 (5th
Cir. 1968), vacated as moot sub nom., Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir.
1968).
163. Id. at 618–19.
164. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
165. Id. at 728 (quoting Dickey, 273 F. Supp. at 617–18) (emphasis omitted).
166. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 16 n.14
(quoting decision of District Court Judge Mize in Burnside).
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Even though the language of the actual disruption test was widely
cited, courts remained inclined to exercise substantial deference to
school administrators’ decisions, whether the administrators were
167
punishing speech retroactively or quashing it prospectively.
Thus,
even after Burnside and Blackwell’s significant steps forward, students’
speech rights were extremely limited in reality.
Parties in four of the twelve cases discussed above petitioned the
168
Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court granted these petitions in
169
170
two cases: Tinker (by a 5-4 vote) and Jones, eventually deciding
Tinker and reversing the grant in Jones without hearing the case.
171

C. Not Inevitable: Tinker v. Des Moines in the Supreme Court

Scholars and lawyers today often seem to speak about Tinker as
though it sprung fully-formed from the Court, much like Athena
from Zeus’s head, and as though it could not have turned out any
other way. To challenge this accepted understanding, this Part
returns again to the months and days before Tinker was decided,
reexamining the parties’ arguments, considering the memoranda
from a law clerk to the author of the majority opinion, evaluating
drafts of the Tinker opinion, and examining the effect of the lastminute addition of Burnside and Blackwell to Tinker.
1.

Revisiting the parties’ arguments
Compared to many of the other student speech cases in the
pipeline, Tinker presented especially strong facts for the students. As
in Burnside and Blackwell, the students in Tinker were engaged in
serious, political speech as opposed to litigating their “right” to sport
167. See Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping
Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 65-75 (1996) (discussing the
competing theories of the purpose of education and the proper levels of deference
to school officials in each model, and highlighting the Court’s new approach to these
questions in Tinker).
168. Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 856 (1968); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. Tenn.
1968), aff’d, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969), cert.
dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970), reh’g. denied, 397 U.S. 1018 (1970); Barker v. Hardway,
283 F. Supp. 228, 236 (S.D. W. Va. 1968), aff’d, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
169. Docket Sheet, No. 21, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., in
William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1428, Folder OT—1968 Administrative, Dockets #1199, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
170. 279 F. Supp. at 197.
171. Iowa historian John W. Johnson wrote a book-length historical treatment of
the Tinker case and the players involved. THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER
V. DES MOINES AND THE 1960S (1997).
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Beatles-style haircuts or something similarly frivolous.
And, unlike
the speech in Blackwell and in many of the civil rights demonstrations
in colleges and universities, the Tinker speech did not disrupt the
173
educational environment in a significant way.
This lack of
disruption might have enhanced the Court’s willingness to grant
certiorari in Tinker, but at the very least it simplified the issue for the
174
Court.
As they had done in the courts below, the Tinker plaintiffs argued
in the Supreme Court for a clear and present danger standard under
175
which students’ speech seldom could be restricted by schools. They
further maintained that their speech was constitutionally protected
176
under that test. The students’ brief compared their actions to those
of the students in Burnside, arguing not only that both sets of actions
were “dignified, peaceful gesture[s]” of respectfully dissenting
citizens, but also that neither situation caused actual disruption of the
177
educational process. By contrast, the school district argued that the
Court should employ the actual or reasonably anticipated disruption
178
The school district
test under which it won in the district court.
also contended that its decisions to discipline its students were
entitled to significant deference from the courts, yet this credibilitybased claim was undercut by the school district’s own brief which was
179
laden with conspiracy theory language.

172. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–08 (1969);
see supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text (discussing two cases in which
students were suspended or not allowed to enroll because of their respective
hairstyles).
173. Id. at 508.
174. Three years before deciding Tinker, the Court had noted in a civil rights
protest case:
Fortunately, the circumstances here were such that no claim can be made
that use of the library by others was disturbed in the demonstration. Perhaps
the time and method were carefully chosen with this in mind. Were it
otherwise, a factor not present in this case would have to be considered.
Here, there was no disturbance of others, no disruption of library activities,
and no violation of any library regulations.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
175. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (No. 1034).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 19.
178. Brief for Respondents at 26, Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (No. 1034).
179. See id. at 18–19 (“When Reverend Tinker has four children, ages 15, 13, 11
and 8 going to their respective schools each with a black arm band, is it more
reasonable to conclude they were doing this as a matter of conscience in the exercise
of their constitutional rights, or is Reverend Tinker, the Secretary for Peace and
Education, through his children, undertaking to infiltrate the school with his
propaganda?”).
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The Court’s creation of Tinker’s disruption tests
Between the parties’ briefs (followed by oral argument) and the
Court’s written opinion, there is, as always, a gap in the official
record. Yet, the archived personal papers of several Supreme Court
justices provide insight into the Court’s process of creating the Tinker
opinion. Two types of documents in these files are particularly
valuable for the purpose of tracing the steps in the creation of
Tinker’s tests and the eventual incorporation of the tests used in
Burnside, Blackwell, and the Tinker district court: first, memoranda
180
from a law clerk to Justice Fortas, the author of the majority
opinion, and second, Fortas’s drafts of the opinions, some of which
were circulated among the Justices.
Taken together, these
documents reveal that the Tinker tests were hardly a foregone
conclusion.
The first post-oral argument document in Justice Fortas’s Tinker
181
files is a lengthy memorandum from law clerk Martha Field dated
182
November 27, 1968.
Regarding the question of the test to be
applied, Field cautioned against “lay[ing] down any definitive rule in
this opinion” in part because the substantial and material
interference standards at issue in Blackwell, Burnside, and Tinker below
“are meaningless, because their meaning changes with their
183
application.” She recommended:
2.

It seems to me that the best that can be done is to show that the
same basic tests apply for regulation of the First Am [sic] rights in
the schools as anywhere else (regulation must be justified by
substantial state interest), though different interests are of
importance in the schools (greater importance of order) so that
the application of the broad standard may lead to different
results. . . . At the same time the Court can make clear that it is a
legitimate interest on the part of the schools to maintain sufficient
order in the classroom so that educational functions are not
180. A fascinating literature about the role of Supreme Court law clerks has been
emerging in recent years. See, e.g., David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The
Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947 (2007) (reviewing two
recent books on the same topic).
181. Field would go on to become a professor at Harvard Law School and the
second woman to be awarded tenure there.
182. Notably, the memorandum presented the argument that wearing the
armbands was protectable speech that could be distinguished from other ruleviolating student conduct. It then established that the First Amendment was
applicable to schools through the Fourteenth Amendment and, in support of free
speech, quoted various passages from the Court’s decisions emphasizing the
importance of schools as creating future citizens. Memorandum from Martha Field
to Justice Fortas 4–5 (Nov. 27, 1968), in Abe Fortas Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box
79, Folder 1666, Yale University Library Manuscript Collections.
183. Id. at 10.
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interfered with, and that where there is likelihood that a form of
“speech” by the students would disrupt this order, the school can
184
regulate that speech.

In what appears to be a slightly later document (two pages stapled
in the middle of another copy of the November 27, 1968
memorandum), Field expanded on this argument, noting that the
substantial and material disruption test “would have some meaning”
“[f]or purposes of this case” but because lower courts would find it
difficult to apply, “[t]he Court should therefore lay down some
guidelines for how to arrive at a calculation of which interests are
substantial and what constitutes sufficient evidence of substantial
185
interference with them.”
Had the Court taken this approach and
been able to produce meaningful guidelines, it could have averted
many of the uncertainties that have plagued student speech doctrine
186
for the past four decades.
Field also appeared sympathetic to the school district’s position
that it should be able to maintain order in its classrooms. But, raising
a concern seemingly alien to the lower courts in Tinker and the courts
deciding the other student speech cases, she speculated that the
“breadth of discretion” the school district claimed for itself was easily
abused: “school officials can hypothesize the requisite likelihood of
disorder for anything that they don’t like, for whatever reason,
including reasons that violate the First Amendment, and administer a
187
highly discriminatory system.”
Furthermore, Field noted the
unobtrusive nature of the Tinker armband protest and analogized it
to the students who wore freedom buttons in Burnside; in neither
184. Id. at 10–11. At a few points, Field suggested that a school district may
restrict student speech when the restriction is supported by a compelling state
interest: “[t]his means that the same test of validity under the First Amendment
applies in the schools as anywhere else. In schools, however, unlike other places, the
State does have a compelling interest in the orderly operation of the classroom.” Id.
at 5. Spelling out this idea, she focused on two issues: “the danger that the state is
trying to avert must be a substantial danger, and it must be likely that it will result in
the absence of the regulation.” Id. at 8. Field also noted that the school district’s
written rationale for the regulation was generated after the students were disciplined,
but that in her opinion none of the school district’s reasons “constituted a sufficient
justification for the regulation.” Id. at 9.
185. Memorandum from Law Clerk Marty to Justice Fortas 10 (Nov. 27, 1968), in
Abe Fortas Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1666, Yale University Library
Manuscript Collections.
186. Much of the student speech literature discusses these difficulties. See
Bowman, supra note 87, at 198 (asserting that despite the Court’s precedent, student
speech doctrine is not clearly defined); Dupre, supra note 167, at 54 (discussing the
Court’s jurisprudence of discipline and order); Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really
Be Free Speech in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45 (2008); Taylor, supra note
107, at 587–91 (discussing unanswered questions about Tinker and substantial
disruption).
187. Memorandum from Martha Field to Justice Fortas, supra note 182, at 7.
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situation, she suggested, were other students’ rights affected by the
188
This theme, linked to the idea of nonprotesters’ behavior.
189
disruption and also a regular focus of civil rights protest cases,
would carry through to the final version of the majority opinion in
190
Tinker, becoming the “rights of others” test courts and scholars have
191
found to be cryptic ever since.
In addition to Field’s insightful memoranda, Justice Fortas’s papers
also contain drafts of the majority opinion at various stages in its
development. These drafts reveal that although Burnside and
Blackwell eventually formed the foundation of the Court’s test in
Tinker, early drafts took a different direction. The document which
appears to be the earliest typed draft of the majority opinion contains
no references to Burnside or Blackwell and, accordingly, the specific
192
rule of the case is not the same as the published version of Tinker.
The rule in this earliest draft swept broadly:
There can be no doubt that the school authorities would have been
entirely justified in prohibiting students from engaging in any form
of expression or any activity which disrupted or interfered with the
operation of the school or the conduct of classes, or which
193
significantly threatened the safety or order of students or faculty.

Later in that same draft, another iteration of the rule emerged:
Persons who are lawfully on [school] premises, at times and in
circumstances which are within their right, may express their views
on issues of public importance provided that the form of
expression does not disrupt or interfere with the purpose or
function of the school and the orderly conduct of its activities . . .
including the safety and discipline of other members of the school
194
community.

On one hand, in this first available draft of Tinker, school officials
were given a wide berth to quash the speech of students, employees,
188. Id. at 5.
189. See BELL, supra note 10, at 585–88 (discussing balancing school protest rights
and, more specifically, Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
190. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
191. Barnette also employed the “rights of others” language, but the dispute about
the meaning of that phrase has occurred in the cases and articles discussing students’
affirmative speech rights, not their rights to refrain from speaking. See, e.g., Harper v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13402 (9th Cir. May 31, 2006) (concluding that a student’s t-shirt
condemning homosexuality impinged on the rights of other students); Bowman,
supra note 87, at 201–07 (discussing the rights of others test).
192. Ten-page typed draft of majority opinion in Tinker 6, in Abe Fortas Papers,
Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1667, Yale University Library Manuscript
Collections.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7–8.

1162

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1129

or permitted visitors presumably on the showing of any disruption or
interference. Yet at the same time, arguably like Burnside and
Blackwell, this draft also limited schools’ authority to restrict speech by
emphasizing the form of the speech as the element giving rise to
disruption and the one for which the student speakers would be held
accountable—not the message and not the reaction of other
195
individuals in the school environment.
But those were not the tests for which Tinker would become wellknown; only after Burnside and Blackwell were incorporated into a late
draft of the Tinker opinion would the so-called Tinker tests emerge. In
the near-final draft—which, for the first time, articulated the
disruption and rights of others tests—Tinker changed in at least three
significant ways.
First, the addition of Burnside and Blackwell caused the Tinker tests
to become more nuanced. The primary test was no longer whether
disruption or interference had occurred at all, in which case the
speech could be quashed, but rather, quoting Burnside, whether
speech “materially and substantially interfere[d] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
196
school” (if not, the speech was permitted). As in the earlier draft of
the opinion, this test sought to balance students’ rights and interests
in expressing their opinions with the school’s interest in maintaining
order and delivering education. Yet, adding the key words from
Burnside and Blackwell to this version of Tinker both strengthened
students’ speech rights and made the test more subject to
manipulation. Ideally, the “substantial and material” language would
have led to a greater number of fair results despite having less
predictability than a more bright-line test.
But, the lack of
consistency among the past forty years of student speech cases and
the growing number of open questions about student speech
197
doctrine demonstrate that this test does not seem to consistently
produce either predictability or fairness.
Second, a “reasonable anticipation of substantial and material
disruption” rule functionally equivalent to the rule employed by the
195. In 1960s civil rights protest cases, lower courts usually placed “[t]he
responsibility for disturbances or disruption . . . on the protesters, even though
disorder was frequently the result of action by police or hostile spectators.” BELL,
supra note 10, at 553; see also Berkman, supra note 3 at 591-92.
196. Ten-page incomplete typeset and formatted draft of majority opinion in
Tinker, in Abe Fortas Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1668, Yale
University Library Manuscript Collections.
197. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(discussing qualified immunity and noting the lack of clarity that permeates the
realm of student speech doctrine).
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198

district court in Tinker emerged in this draft as well.
This was an
important addition because many of the twelve cases after Burnside
and Blackwell grappled with situations similar to Tinker in which a
student’s speech was silenced before any disruption had occurred. If
courts recognize (as they do) that it is important for schools to
maintain order, then schools must be able to act in advance of actual
disruptions and not always wait to see whether speech produces the
disruptive effect school officials think it will. The Fifth Circuit’s
actual disruption rule was so student-protective that it had not
permitted proactive restriction. So, the Court built upon the actual
disruption test and again balanced the interests of the students and
the school, requiring the anticipation of substantial and material
disruption to be “reasonable,” not merely based on an “urgent wish to
199
avoid . . . controversy.” (As with the actual disruption test discussed
immediately above, the malleability of “reasonableness” has led to a
host of problems.)
Third, by changing the opinion in these ways the Supreme Court
adopted the test used by the district court below and advocated by the
school district on appeal—not the test put forth by the students.
Scholars and students of Tinker regularly lose sight of the fact that it
was the Court’s decision to overturn the school’s disciplinary decision
using the school district’s own test that gave rise to this celebrated
student speech victory. The school district had counted on the Court
continuing to defer substantially to school districts’ decision making,
whether school districts were adopting rules, implementing rules, or
disciplining students for violating those rules. But in Tinker, the
Court diverged from that path and carved out a space for protected
student protest, not trusting school administrators across the country
200
to make the same decision. This was a substantial shift, one Richard
198. Fifteen-page typed draft of majority opinion in Tinker 8, in Abe Fortas
Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1667, Yale University Library Manuscript
Collections. “[I]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
suppression of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompanies expression of an unpopular viewpoint.
Certainly, where there is no finding and no showing that the exercise of the
prohibited right would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be
sustained.” Id. (citing Burnside). This fairly final draft elaborated more on
reasonable anticipation: “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Id. at 7.
199. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969).
200. See Denno, supra note 88, at 58, 60–62 (commenting that “[a] rather clear
line of recent cases indicates that the traditional deference paid to educational
officials in their handling of student expression is at an explicit end” and discussing
this shift in the Tinker case specifically); Dupre, supra note 167, at 60–61 (discussing
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Berkman described as based on the thesis “that First Amendment
rights in the classroom are actually essential to an effective
educational process in a democracy rather than a source of
201
disruption of that process.”
3.

Justice Black’s dissent and earlier prophetic statement
In response to Justice Fortas’s majority opinion, Justice Black
issued a fiery dissent, rejecting the majority opinion on the basis that
202
students do not have First Amendment rights in public schools.
Three years earlier in a civil rights protest case, Justice Black had
speculated that an “inevitabl[e]” consequence of reversing the
breach of the peace conviction of four African-Americans for
peacefully occupying and refusing to leave a segregated public library
in Louisiana would be “paralyz[ing] the school[s’]” ability to control
203
their educational environments. The Tinker majority may not have
connected its decision with the substance of its civil rights roots as
overtly, but in his slippery slope declaration a few years earlier, Justice
Black had identified the link spot on.
CONCLUSION
In a 1968 article in the Saturday Review, education professor and
higher education historian Lewis Mayhew stated that there may be
“good reason to believe that the present wave of student unrest [is]
204
qualitatively different from those [of] earlier times.” Summarizing
the lack of deference the Court accorded the school in Tinker, and how this
approach represented a significant departure from the cases and social assumptions
that came before)).
201. Berkman, supra note 3, at 581.
202. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). According to the New York
Times, Justice Black “spoke extemporaneously for about 20 minutes” from the bench
when the opinion in Tinker was delivered. He concluded “I want it thoroughly
known that I disclaim any sentence, any word, any part of what the Court does
today.” Fred P. Graham, High Court Upholds a Student Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1969, at A1.
203. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 165 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
204. Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 173 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (quoting
SATURDAY REV., Aug. 17, 1968, at 57) (alteration in original).
Medieval students rioted, dumped garbage on passersby, wrote erotic or
ribald poems and read them on church steps and in other sanctuaries of the
Establishment, coerced their professors and occasionally killed one.
Colonial college students rioted about food, stole, took pot shots at
university presidents, protested infringement of their private lives, and
gradually forced colleges to modify stringent rules regarding personal
conduct. Nineteenth century college students took sides over the Civil War
and demanded a voice in academic governance. Twentieth century signed
the Oxford Peace Pledge, joined in the Spanish Civil War, rioted over food,
violated the Eighteenth Amendment, and experimented with sex. . . . At least
an important portion of student protest replicates those of the past simply
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student protest from medieval times through the 1960s, he surmised
that “[s]tudents have always been difficult to live with and have
frequently assumed postures which bothered adults and disturbed
205
institutions.” Whether or not the students’ unrest in the 1960s was
different, though, the judicial response to students’ non-disruptive
protest certainly was. What changed in Burnside, Blackwell, and Tinker
was that schools were no longer always unquestioned authority
figures disciplining insubordinate, unruly students. Students became
free to engage in peaceful, non-disruptive protest even inside their
schools. By arriving at this result, the Court recognized students’
citizenship, legitimized their dissent, and channeled that dissent into
a direction which promoted respect for the rule of law.
Standing on the shoulders of the Civil Rights Movement and in fact
relying directly on two civil rights student speech cases, Tinker quickly
206
gave rise to a large body of student speech law extensively tailored
207
within American constitutional doctrine,
unusual in the
208
and increasingly full of uncertain
international context,
209
Forty years later, even as student speech doctrine
questions.
becomes increasingly unpredictable, Tinker remains nourished by the
moral stature of its roots in the Civil Rights Movement.

because the process of growing up is, after all, a human process that has not
changed much in quite a few years.
Id. (alterations in original).
205. Id.
206. Roughly forty student speech cases were decided in the year following the
Court’s decision in Tinker. Paul G. Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools:
Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEO. L.J. 37, 38–39, nn.3–8 (1970) (citing student speech
cases decided between 1967 and 1970). In the eight years following Tinker, the
watershed case was cited in nearly 500 decisions. John E. Nichols, The Tinker Case
and Its Interpretation, 52 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1, 2 (1977).
207. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh My! A
Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2007).
208. The body of student speech law appears unique to the United States. See, e.g.,
THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF STUDENTS:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
DEMYSTIFYING THE LEGAL ISSUES (Charles J. Russo et al. eds., 2007) (providing an
overview of thirteen countries’ laws related to students’ rights).
209. “Supreme Court precedents have left lower courts with vague standards for
evaluating student speech, often resulting in conflicting decisions, many of which
simply defer to the decisions of school administrators.” BELL, supra note 10, at 588.
The school district’s attorney in Hazelwood, decided twenty-five years after Tinker,
expressed the opinion that “‘the Tinker case had been abused. The original basis for
Tinker was good but some lower courts had expanded Tinker’” extensively. Anne
Proffitt Dupre, The Story of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: Student Press and
the School Censor 247, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff
Schneider eds., 2008).

